Cold War Orientalism

Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945–1961

Christina Klein
For my mother
and
my father
Sentimental Education

Creating a Global Imaginary of Integration

What we have to do is to convince not only their minds but their hearts. What we need to do is to make the “cold war” a “warm war” by infusing into it ideological principles to give it meaning.

Raymond A. Hare, acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, 1950

In June 1957 Newsweek published a special report on the spread of anti-American attitudes around the world, and, like many publications on international affairs from the late 1940s and 1950s, it illustrated its story with a map. Titled “Worldwide—The Feeling About Us” and spreading across two pages, the map depicts the northern hemisphere from Iceland in the West to Japan in the East (Figure 3). It represents the scope of U.S. global expansion in an unusually forthright manner: eleven text-filled balloons pinpoint the countries and regions where the U.S. had a major military presence, and indicate the number of U.S. troops, government employees, and civilians stationed there. The balloons also summarize the “feeling” of local populations, suggesting the mix of good will and hostility that U.S. expansion provoked. The map notes “minimum personal friction” between Americans and locals in Morocco, “friendly” personal contacts in Great Britain, and “basically good” relations in France. The situation in Asia, however, was less positive: “local frictions” persisted in South Korea, collaboration with Formosa was “endangered” by “increasing civilian-soldier irritations,” relations were “worsening” in Okinawa, and irritations were “growing” in Japan. Even in the Philippines, a nation with which the U.S. enjoyed a “basically strong friendship,” relations had been “hurt” by jurisdictional and
personnel "quarrels." In calling attention to these frictions, the *Newsweek* map conveys some of the anxiety that the assertion of global power generated among Americans when they faced the contingent character of the U.S. presence abroad and the possibility of Asian opposition. The map offered the personalized language of feeling as the appropriate means for expressing that anxiety and for thinking about the dynamics of expansion and resistance.¹

A few weeks after *Newsweek* published this map, Francis Wilcox, a mid-level State Department official, delivered a speech to an audience of educators in Philadelphia that recast the problem of foreign resistance to U.S. expansion into an issue of domestic pedagogy. Wilcox emphasized the profound effect that decolonization was having on the United States. He began by describing the rising influence of the new Asian and African nations and the accompanying shift in the Cold War from the military to the ideological plane. He explained that the Soviet Union, which in the late 1940s and early 1950s had "expanded its empire" into China, Korea, and Indochina through the use of force, was now turning to an "all-out war of ideas, ideologies, propaganda, and subversion" designed to win the allegiance of decolonizing peoples through peaceful means. Wilcox impressed upon his listeners that the U.S.-Soviet competition over the developing nations was creating an educational crisis among Americans, most of whom had been educated in what he called the pre-Pearl Harbor "isolationist era" and thus did not fully comprehend the importance of these new nations. He urged his audience of educators to help train the next generation of Americans for their "new role" of world leadership by teaching them about countries such as Indonesia, whose strategic location and vast natural resources made it valuable to both the Soviets and the U.S. Wilcox pointed out that in years to come an unprecedented number of Americans would spend a portion of their lives abroad as "soldiers, technicians, educators, government officials, business men and women, and tourists." In order for these people to do their jobs well and avoid generating "tensions" abroad, he explained, all Americans needed an "education for overseasmanship."²

This "education for overseasmanship," Wilcox implied, would not entail the learning of new information so much as the cultivation of new feelings. Wilcox did not suggest that Americans study Indonesian languages or history. Rather, he urged his audience to foster "closer economic, political, and cultural ties with the people of Asia and Africa" by training Americans in new attitudes. "We live in an interdependent world," Wilcox told his audience, and Americans had to learn to "un-
derstand the hopes and problems and attitudes of other people.” Waging the Cold War in the decolonizing world, this State Department official explained, would require Americans to “cultivate the quality of empathy—the ability to put yourself in the other fellow’s position and see things from his point of view.” Only by learning new mental and emotional skills, he suggested, could Americans defeat the Soviet Union and secure the allegiance of the decolonizing world for themselves.3

For too long, diplomatic and cultural historians have taken the Truman Doctrine speech as the emblematic expression of Cold War ideology. Truman’s 1947 address, in which he solicited Congressional support for a $400 million aid package to civil-war-torn Greece and Turkey, is often read as marking the start of the Cold War. In it the president cast the postwar situation as a worldwide struggle between “free peoples” who believed in “individual liberty” and “totalitarian regimes” that ruled through “terror and oppression.” In a world structured by this Manichean opposition, Truman declared, the United States must assume leadership of half of that world that was “resisting attempted subjugation” by internal or external forces. The representative status accorded to Truman’s speech has, however, obscured as much as it has revealed about the postwar era. Wilcox’s 1957 speech in Philadelphia—a boilerplate address that reiterated the Eisenhower administration’s key themes and concerns—deserves attention as an equally representative document, just as polemical and just as intent on rallying support for the Cold War, but one that expresses a different set of ideological principles.4

These two speeches should be seen in the context of the gearing up of a vast educational machinery designed to direct the attention of the American people to the world outside the nation’s borders. As Wilcox indicated, the expansion of U.S. power around the globe depended upon the support and services of millions of ordinary Americans, acting as private citizens and as employees of the state, and it could not move forward if Americans continued to think in narrowly national and “isolationist” terms. In the view of political elites, the collective consciousness needed to be reshaped along internationalist lines. This internationalist education occurred in various places throughout the postwar social order, including grade schools, high schools, and universities. It also took place in less formal venues of education, such as the global imaginaries created by political elites and cultural producers.

The speeches by Wilcox and Truman are worth comparing in part because they express two distinct Cold War global imaginaries. A global imaginary is an ideological creation that maps the world conceptually and defines the primary relations among peoples, nations, and regions. As an imaginative, discursive construct, it represents the abstract entity of the “world” as a coherent, comprehensible whole and situates individual nations within that larger framework. It produces peoples, nations, and cultures not as isolated entities but as interconnected with another. This is not to say that it works through deception or that it mystifies the real, material conditions of global relations. Rather, a global imaginary articulates the ways in which people imagine and live those relations. It creates an imaginary coherence out of the contradictions and disjunctures of real relations, and thereby provides a stable sense of individual and national identity. In reducing the infinite complexity of the world to comprehensible terms, it creates a common sense about how the world functions as a system and offers implicit instruction in how to maneuver within that system; it makes certain attitudes and behaviors easier to adopt than others.

Truman’s 1947 speech articulated the relations between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the other nations of the world through what I am calling a global imaginary of containment. Wilcox’s 1957 speech, in turn, articulated those same relations through a global imaginary of integration. These two global imaginaries were not invented by these individuals; they were collectively produced over the course of the late 1940s and 1950s by a broad array of political elites, journalists, academics, and cultural producers. These two global imaginaries educated Americans about the world and their role in it in very different ways. The global imaginary of containment offered a heroic model of education: it imagined the Cold War as a crusade against communism and invited the American people to join in. Much of the energy it generated, however, was directed inward and aimed at ferreting out enemies and subversives within the nation itself. The global imaginary of integration, in contrast, proposed a model of sentimental education. The State Department’s “education for overseasmanship” encouraged Americans to “look outward.” Directed to the world beyond the nation’s borders, it represented the Cold War as an opportunity to forge intellectual and emotional bonds with the people of Asia and Africa. Only by creating such bonds, Wilcox suggested, could the economic, political, and military integration of the “free world” be achieved and sustained. When it did turn inward, the global imaginary of integration generated an inclusive rather than a policing energy.5

Most cultural histories of the Cold War take the foreign policy and ideology of containment as their foundation. I want to emphasize the
discursive workings of integration instead. This chapter compares the global imaginaries of containment and integration, and explores the discursive and institutional means through which political elites undertook the sentimental education of the American people.

CONTAINMENT AND INTEGRATION
AS IDEOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

Containment and integration constituted the two ideological foundations of postwar foreign policy. Containment was a distinctly Cold War strategic ideology. Based on U.S. balance-of-power concerns vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it posited a zero-sum conflict between Moscow, which it figured as aggressive and expansionist, and Washington, which it figured as defensive and peaceful. Containment held that, since cooperation with the Soviets was impossible and all communist governments were subservient to Moscow, the expansion of communism anywhere in the world posed a direct threat to the U.S. share of world power. George Kennan articulated its defining logic when he called for the "long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" through the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points." After the Truman Doctrine speech, containment became one central goal of postwar foreign policy.6

The ideology of integration, in contrast, originated in the nation's fundamental economic structures. Americans have always understood their democratic political freedoms to be inseparable from their economic ones. Since at least the early nineteenth century they have also believed that the nation's economy, in order to remain healthy, had continually to expand and integrate new markets and sources of raw materials. As the U.S. extended its reach, first westward and then into the Caribbean and the Pacific, it gradually created an economy that had a regional rather than merely a continental scope. This regional Pacific economy began to take shape early on, when the U.S. began trading with China in the 1780s and opened Japan up to Western trade in 1853. Seeking reliable stepping stones to these Asian markets, Washington acquired a territorial empire in the Pacific: it annexed the Midway Islands in 1867, Samoa in 1878, Hawaii, Guam, and the Philippines in 1898 (through the Spanish-American War), and Wake Island in 1899. Washington launched a policy of informal, or free trade, imperialism in 1899-1900 when it issued the "open door" notes to China and extended it in the 1920s under the rubric of "dollar diplomacy." World War II helped create a U.S. economy with a worldwide rather than merely regional reach and cemented the belief in the unity of economic and political freedoms. In the decades that followed, any restrictions on U.S. economic growth—such as those posed by communist governments—were seen as a threat to the nation's fundamental political structure and to what came to be called "the American way of life." At a time when the U.S. economy needed truly global access to markets and resources in order to sustain itself, the defense of the nation demanded securing that access through a variety of political and military means.

The ideology of integration took on a distinctive shape during the Cold War. Melvyn Leffler and Thomas McCormick have argued that the Cold War should be seen as a competition between the United States and the Soviets not just for strategic advantage, but also for exclusive access to the world's markets, industrial infrastructure, and natural resources. Washington concluded that the best way to guarantee its own access was by expanding the capitalist system of free trade on a global scale. As a result, it sought to create an internationally integrated free market economic order, in which each nation would have unrestricted access to the markets and raw materials of all the others, while capital, goods, and people would move freely across national borders. By giving up any efforts at economic self-sufficiency, individual nations would become dependent on each other for their prosperity and thus, Washington believed, much less likely to engage in activities that would lead to war. In practice, creating this economic order meant integrating the core industrial economies of the democratic West and Japan with the markets and resource-rich economies of the decolonizing periphery. Washington perceived any effort on the part of decolonizing nations to remain outside of this integrated system—by pursuing nationalist economic policies, for instance—as a threat to the economic and political stability of the capitalist "free world." The creation of this integrated global economy—and its preservation through political and military means—became, along with the containment of the Soviet Union, the other fundamental goal of postwar U.S. policymakers.7

Far from being opposed to each other, the containment of the Soviet Union and the integration of the capitalist "free world" are best understood as two sides of the same coin. The military alliances designed to contain Soviet expansion also facilitated economic integration among member nations, and the foreign aid programs designed to stimulate struggling economies served as channels for delivering military assis-
tance. Together the principles of containment and integration undergirded Washington's postwar foreign policy agenda and led to the creation of international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank), massive foreign aid projects (Marshall Plan), and world-straddling political and military alliances (NATO, SEATO).

Washington pursued this double strategy of containment and integration throughout Asia in the late 1940s and 1950s. At the end of World War II, the U.S. had preponderant power in the region (as it did in the rest of the world), with troops spread throughout the Pacific and on the Asian mainland. Washington undertook as its first major postwar project the occupation and reconstruction of Japan. Between 1945 and 1952 the U.S. promoted the democratization of Japan's political structure, restored its industrial economy, and ensured that it remained beyond Soviet reach; the peace and security treaties of 1951, which granted the U.S. extensive military rights, cemented Japan's integration into the Western political and economic system. In the late 1940s the U.S. intervened in China's civil war, giving financial and military support to Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (Nationalist) government in its struggle against Mao Zedong's communist forces; when Chiang fled to Taiwan in 1949, the U.S. continued its support and refused to recognize the communist government on the mainland. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Washington rushed in thousands of troops to contain what it saw as a Soviet-backed invasion of South Korea. In subsequent years, the U.S. dispatched military advisors to and launched nation-building projects in South Vietnam, explored atomic bombs on the Bikini atoll, and sent the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan from Chinese attack. It constructed a network of military bases centered in the Philippines, Okinawa, and South Korea, and crafted a web of political treaties that allied the U.S. with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaya, and Pakistan. It increased its economic presence by pouring in billions of dollars in foreign aid, exporting American goods, importing Asia's raw materials, and encouraging private corporate expansion.

At the same time, however, forces across Asia, and especially the revolutionary independence movements, questioned and resisted this expansion of power. Washington had a mixed response to Asian decolonization. On the one hand, it was not unhappy to see the European empires dissolve. Washington regarded these empires, which functioned as restricted trading blocs, as obstacles to economic integration and as incubators of communism and anti-Western revolution. On the other hand, Washington recognized that Europe's economic and political stability often depended upon income generated in the colonies. Whether the United States supported or opposed a particular nationalist movement often depended on its relationship to communism. In Indonesia, for example, the U.S. initially endorsed Dutch efforts to reimpose colonial control at the end of the war, but in 1949 switched to support independence. A number of factors shaped this decision, but one of the most important was the staunch anticommunism of the Indonesian independence movement. Nationalist leaders had made clear their willingness to protect Western investments and preserve Western access to markets and resources after independence. In Indochina, in contrast, Washington sustained its support for the French war against the Vietnamese: unlike Indonesia's Sukarno, Ho Chi Minh was an avowed communist. To Washington, this meant that an independent Vietnam would inevitably ally itself with the Soviet Union, restrict Western access to markets and resources, and refuse integration into the international capitalist economy. Washington only endorsed nationalist movements, such as those in Indonesia and the Philippines, that promised to preserve Western access after independence. It was willing to abolish formal empire, as long as the relations of informal empire continued uninterrupted.

Throughout the later 1940s and the 1950s, the United States suffered from what many Americans saw as major setbacks in Asia. Many in Washington took Mao's victory in China in 1949 as a devastating "loss" of 500 million friends and a dangerous shift in the world's balance of power, while the unsatisfying end to the Korean War in 1953 and the creation of a separate North Vietnam in 1954 seemed to portend the inexorable spread of communism. The birth of the nonaligned movement, the growth of nationalist sentiment, and the strengthening of anti-American attitudes challenged U.S. interests throughout the region. Over the course of the 1950s Indian intellectuals cast doubt on American claims to world leadership, North Vietnamese guerrillas killed American advisors, Japanese neutralists protested the extension of U.S. military rights, and Taiwanese civilians rioted against the extraterritorial powers of American military courts.

The result was that even as Washington extended its power in Asia, political elites often saw the U.S. as failing to achieve its goals there. Many Americans in the 1950s feared they were "losing" Asia just as they had "lost" China. This intense fear of loss fueled an almost obsessive public discourse that centered on securing the allegiance of decolo-
nizing nations and binding them to America. Tension between the desire to integrate Asia and the fear of losing Asia permeated American thinking in the late 1940s and 1950s. It was one of the forces that drove foreign policymaking and spurred the flood of popular representations. It was this anxiety about Asia that Newsweek captured in its 1957 map, "Worldwide—The Feeling About Us" (Figure 3).

WINNING THE MINDS OF MEN

Although political elites crafted the foreign policies of containment and integration, they needed a broad base of public support in order to implement them successfully. The central task, as so many contemporary observers described it, became one of "winning the minds of men." The minds that needed to be won, however, belonged not only to people overseas, who might be tempted to choose communism over democratic capitalism, but to Americans as well, who might resist such an expansive—and expensive—foreign policy agenda. This meant that the waging of the Cold War was as much a domestic endeavor as a foreign one—and as much an educational endeavor as a political or military one. The American public needed to be schooled in internationalism: it needed to be persuaded to accept the nation's sustained engagement in world affairs, its participation in international organizations, and its long-range cooperation with other governments. Woodrow Wilson's failure to secure public support for his internationalist agenda after World War I, which many saw as paving the way for World War II, loomed large in the minds of policymakers, and they vowed not to repeat his mistakes.

Formidable obstacles hindered the winning of American minds. Weary from wartime sacrifice and eager to return to the work of family formation and homemaking, Americans often preferred to focus their attention on domestic political concerns. The very newness of containment and integration policies, which violated a long-standing tradition of avoiding permanent alliances outside the Western hemisphere, provoked public opposition, while the abstract nature of their objectives, in sharp contrast to the concrete goals of World War II, generated little enthusiasm. Fearing foreign economic competition, many Americans expressed skepticism about the value of free trade—a cornerstone of international economic integration—and wished to keep tariffs and trade barriers high. Underneath it all ran a lingering isolationist sentiment, which worried political leaders throughout the 1950s.9

In the late 1940s Truman's foreign policy agenda also faced serious opposition from the political right and left, each of which had its own vision of the kind of relationship that the United States should maintain with the rest of the world. The mid-term elections of 1946 delivered both houses of Congress to the Republican party, whose powerful right wing appeared bent on pursuing a neo-isolationist agenda. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and his followers were economic nationalists who sought a self-sufficient U.S. economy and opposed Truman's policies of international economic and political integration. Traditionally known as isolationists, they were in fact only isolationist in regard to Europe, which they feared for its economic competition and disdained as morally corrupt. Fervently anticommunist, they desired a unilateralist foreign policy in which the U.S. acted alone, unimpeded by political and military alliances; they despised the United Nations as a precursor to world government. Bruce Cumings has identified "bulwarks" as the central metaphor of what I am calling this "right internationalism": barriers to prevent the spread of communism, to keep foreign goods out of the U.S., and to protect the moral rectitude of the American people.10

The Democratic left, in turn, made its bid for the direction of foreign policy in 1948, when Henry Wallace ran for president under the banner of the Progressive Party, a broad coalition of liberal groups endorsed by the American Communist Party. True internationalists, Wallace and his supporters were economic internationalists who advocated increased free trade and opposed Truman's policies of containing the Soviet Union. Heirs to Woodrow Wilson's idealistic global views and advocates of the United Nations, they rejected unilateralism in favor of a one-worldism that would knit the United States together with all other nations into a truly global system. Politically, they sought to extend Roosevelt's wartime alliances into the postwar period. Although opposed to communism, they did not believe that the Soviet Union needed to be ostracized from the international system; instead, they proposed enmeshing the Soviet Union with the U.S. and other capitalist democracies through a network of political and economic ties. The central metaphor, according to Cumings, of this "left-liberal internationalism" was the "open door": it sought a world in which obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, people, and ideas would be transcended.11

These competing internationalisms posed a problem for Truman, in part because each had ties to a broader social movement that had successfully embedded its particular global vision into a network of social institutions and cultural practices. The Protestant missionary movement, although not allied exclusively with the Republican party, pro-
vided right internationalism with a number of outspoken advocates and a steady stream of intellectual energy. Grounded in the universalist values of Christianity, missionaries had been powerful promoters of internationalist thinking since the nineteenth century. In general, they encouraged a U.S.-centered internationalism based on spreading American values and institutions and transforming other nations along American lines, initially through religious conversion and later by building schools, universities, and hospitals. With its network of congregations and settlements, the missionary movement also created a worldwide institutional infrastructure that enabled millions of Americans, especially in isolated Midwestern and rural communities, to understand themselves as participating in world affairs. These institutions enabled Americans to feel themselves bound to the people of Asia and Africa, despite the myriad differences that separated them, through ties of religion, money, and emotional investment.12

Missionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also served as influential producers of knowledge about Asia. Prolific generators of newsletters, books, and photographs that circulated widely throughout American culture, missionaries effectively “produced” China, Japan, India, and other parts of Asia at a time when few Americans had such direct contact. At the same time, they also produced a particular identity for America. Missionaries played an instrumental role in creating the idea of a “special relationship” between the United States and China. A sentimentalized version of American exceptionalism, the “special relationship” defined America, in contrast to the European nations, as a non-imperial power that renounced military force in favor of economic access and political influence. It posited China as a nation of endless needs and America as its benefactor and protector, as well as a nurturer of democracy and modernizing reforms.13

Communism was the other great universalistic system of thought that offered Americans a way to feel themselves tied to the larger world. Richard Wright, in his contribution to the 1950 bestseller The God That Failed, explained the appeal that communist internationalism held in the 1930s. Like Christianity, it enabled the individual to transcend barriers of race and nation and discover a deep human connection. In joining the Communist Party, Wright argued, a black man became “one with all the members there, regardless of race or color”; he entered into an unparalleled state of “kinship” and “oneness” in which “his heart was theirs and their hearts were his.” Communism appealed to Wright, as the missionary movement did to rural Americans, because it allowed him to participate in a worldwide moral struggle that bound him to millions of others despite differences of language, race, or geography. It likewise gave him an equivalent sense of global identification: “With the exception of the church and its myths and legends, there was no agency in the world so capable of making men feel the earth and the people upon it as the Communist Party.”14

During the 1930s and 1940s, the Popular Front opened up this appealing form of left internationalism to thousands of Americans who did not think of themselves as communists. While not all left-liberal internationalists embraced the Popular Front, it did provide the political left with an institutional framework and a source of intellectual energy similar to what missionary culture provided for the political right. The Front functioned as a loose network of organizations—unions, cultural groups, refugee aid organizations, and adult education centers—that educated Americans about the world and provided an opportunity to participate in international politics. During the years when Washington retreated in the face of rising fascism, Popular Front groups promoted a politics of international solidarity, mobilizing Americans “to stand with the Spanish Republic besieged by fascist Franco, to support Ethiopia invaded by Mussolini, to defend China against Japan, and to aid the victims and refugees from Hitler’s Third Reich.” The popularity of the Front derived in part from its ability to tap into the reservoirs of Wilsonian internationalism that still existed and to create an institutional infrastructure in which a broad range of internationalists, from communists to liberals, could come together. Like the missionary movement, the Popular Front generated its own distinctive culture. Some of its representative works, such as Orson Welles’s “voodoo” Macbeth, changed the way Americans imagined the world by telling international stories of antifascist and anti-imperial solidarity. Others, such as Earl Robinson’s musical anthem “Ballad for Americans,” altered the ways Americans imagined the nation by redefining it as a multiracial, multinational entity. Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of Popular Front culture was its aesthetic of social consciousness and political commitment, neatly captured by the book Writers Take Sides, in which noted authors expressed their support for the loyalists in the Spanish civil war. The Communist Party, with its motto “Art is a class weapon,” had a tradition of valuing culture for its political utility. While the Popular Front deemphasized this idea of culture as a tool of social conflict and replaced it with the idea of culture as a means for uniting people, it continued to view culture as a medium of political expression and an arena for political activism.15
While the missionary movement and the Popular Front spoke to the general tendencies of right and left internationalism, they were not wholly homogenous or mutually exclusive groups. The missionary movement had its cosmopolitan side, its social gospel tradition had clear progressive tendencies, and some children of missionaries crossed over to embrace Popular Front ideas. At the same time, the Popular Front welcomed the support of missionaries when their interests converged, as they did on the issue of China in the 1930s. In 1939, for instance, former medical missionary and future right-wing Republican Congressman Walter Judd addressed the Fifth Congress of the American League against War and Fascism, a Popular Front organization.

The Truman administration, in order to secure passage of its ambitious Cold War foreign policy agenda, needed to forge a new historical bloc, a hegemonic alliance that would incorporate the divergent interests and constituencies of both left-liberal and right internationalism. In the late 1940s Truman did exactly that, crafting a synthesis—the famed “Cold War consensus”—that remained stable for decades. Truman's containment/integration model, which became the dominant form of postwar internationalism, combined the left-liberal ideal of international integration with the right's fierce opposition to communism. It thus retained these alternative internationalisms within itself as residual formations. It gave up the truly global scope of left-liberal internationalism's economic and political vision and with it the idea of enmeshing the Soviet Union in a “one world” framework. In its place, it created what Bruce Cumings has called a “second-best” internationalism, in which political and military bulwarks divided the world into a capitalist “free world” and a communist “bloc.” Within that “free world,” however, much of the left-liberal internationalist vision prevailed as nations around the world became economically and politically integrated via an open door economic system. This compromise satisfied the centers of both parties, enabling Truman to create an alliance that included Republicans such as John Foster Dulles and Arthur Vandenberg alongside the members of his own party.16

THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY OF CONTAINMENT

The Truman administration forged this Cold War historical bloc in large part by boosting anticommunism, and thus containment, to the status of national ideology. Beginning with the Truman Doctrine speech in 1947, the president spearheaded a campaign designed to sell his foreign policy—and the idea of the Cold War more generally—by identifying communism abroad and at home as a threat to the nation that demanded an extraordinary response. Truman deployed anticommunism as a political weapon against the competing alternatives of left and right internationalism. His emphasis on anticommunism co-opted the right by embracing one of the central tenets of its internationalist vision, while bankrupting Taft’s “isolationism” and unilateralism as responsible approaches to world affairs. It also undermined the left, enabling Truman to weed out those members of his own party who advocated working with the Soviet Union and to label their vision of internationalism as potentially treasonous, as he did during the Henry Wallace campaign in 1948. Truman used anticommunism to delegitimize competing voices on foreign policy and to ensure that there would be only one model of internationalism circulating in the public sphere.17

This deployment of anticommunism helped forge the postwar hegemonic alliance by defining the boundaries of acceptable political debate and by creating mechanisms for silencing those excluded from the alliance. Thousands of Americans, overwhelmingly on the left-liberal side of the political spectrum, lost their jobs and had their reputations ruined through what can be characterized as domestic containment programs. The Federal Employee Loyalty Program, which was launched only days after the Truman Doctrine speech, purged suspected communists and sympathizers from the federal civil service and prompted similar action at every level of government. Between 1948 and 1955 the Attorney General’s office and the House Committee on Un-American Activities published long lists of allegedly subversive organizations, participation in any of which was grounds for suspicion, a hearing before a loyalty board, and often dismissal from one’s job. These actions quickly winnowed the ranks of the Popular Front and decimated its institutional infrastructure.18

Domestic containment fell particularly hard on those who held left-liberal internationalist views on China. After the so-called “loss” of China in 1949, the China Lobby moved into the political limelight. The Lobby was an informal group of mostly right-internationalist politicians and private citizens who had supported Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang government during the civil war and continued to do so after he retreated to Taiwan. The Lobby publicly attacked a number of American China experts who, having seen Mao’s success in the civil war as all but inevitable, had recommended that Washington prepare to work with the new communist government. Starting with Senator Joseph McCarthy in
1950, the China Lobby and its supporters accused these scholars and foreign-service officials of working secretly to ensure Mao’s victory. Years of accusations and investigations followed, and numerous China experts—including John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent, O. Edmund Clubb, and Owen Lattimore—had their careers derailed, their reputations tarnished, and their access to the media restricted. The Institute of Pacific Relations, which in the 1930s and early 1940s had been the premier scholarly organization devoted to Asia, collapsed after the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee charged it in 1952 with being an “instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and military intelligence.”

The U.S. government also focused its coercive energies after 1949 on Chinese Americans as potential spies and subversives. Chinese family organizations sometimes ran afoul of the FBI for maintaining ties to similar organizations in communist China, while the Immigration and Naturalization Service used deceptive tactics to deport Chinese who it thought might be sympathetic to the mainland government. In 1956 federal agents swept through Chinatowns on the East and West coasts in an effort to track down suspected communists who it feared had entered the country illegally. Domestic containment policies revived latent “yellow peril” fears of a combined Chinese threat from both within and outside the nation.

Containment worked as such a powerful hegemonic discourse because it created a global imaginary—a comprehensive way of understanding the world as a whole and America’s role in it. The global imaginary of containment mapped the world in terms of Otherness and difference. It drew heavily on the right-internationalist vision of a world divided by bulwarks, as can be seen in James Burnham’s map, “World Struggle,” published in Life a few days after the Truman Doctrine speech (Figure 4). In keeping with its title, Burnham’s map organizes the world around the principle of conflict. In contrast to a Mercator projection map, which separates the U.S. and Soviet Union with wide stretches of ocean, this map prioritizes the U.S.-Soviet relationship by centering on the North Pole and representing the adversaries in close physical proximity. A politically resonant color scheme visually emphasizes the boundaries that divide the two superpowers: Russia and its possessions are bright red, and the areas under its influence shaded pink; America and its possessions are white, and the areas under its influence shaded pale gray. A series of gestural arrows animate the “struggle” of the title by indicating the Soviet Union’s aggressive and expansionist tendencies,
pointing to America’s defensive commitments, and suggesting the places most likely to flare up into conflict. The map’s bipolar structure reduces the developing regions of the world to a position of secondary importance: it literally marginalizes South America, Africa, and Asia by pushing them to the edges and cutting off portions of their landmasses. The global imaginary of containment, by mapping the world conceptually in terms of conflict, established a clear global identity and role for the U.S. It educated Americans at all levels of society about how the world worked and made it easier for them to endorse particular courses of action, such as the militarization of foreign policy and the creation of a national security state.21

The global imaginary of containment also translated anticommunism into a structure of feeling and a set of social and cultural practices that could be lived at the level of everyday life. Fear served as the emotional glue that held this imagined world together: fear of Soviet expansion abroad, of communist subversion at home, of nuclear war. The logic of containment rendered deviance in all its forms—sexual, political, behavioral—a source of anxiety and an object of investigation. The global imaginary of containment also opened up the Cold War to popular participation: ordinary Americans could take part in the “world struggle” by naming names, testifying before investigatory committees, enlisting their local community groups in the crusade, and keeping an eye on their neighbors and colleagues.

A number of social and cultural historians have characterized postwar America as dominated by what Alan Nadel has called “containment culture.” Elaine Tyler May has described containment as the “overarching principle” that guided middle-class Americans into the fervent embrace of domesticity and traditional gender roles. Stephen Whitefield and Michael Rogin have traced the politics of anticommunism through popular film (On the Waterfront, My Son John, Kiss Me Deadly). Alan Nadel, finding the logic of containment embedded in texts as diverse as Catcher in the Rye, The Ten Commandments, and Pillow Talk, has argued that containment was “one of the most powerfully deployed national narratives in recorded history.” Together, these scholars have seen containment as a force of restriction, intimidation, and suppression operating across the spectrum of American culture and society: it enforced “conformity” everywhere and led to the “containment of atomic secrets, of sexual license, of gender roles, of nuclear energy, and of artistic expression.”22

Communist China figured prominently in the global imaginary and culture of containment. Resurrecting a long tradition of “yellow peril” imagery, the news media presented the Chinese under Mao as an inscrutable mass of political fanatics, a conformist colony of blue-suited ants. The unexpected and debilitating Chinese assault on U.S. forces during the Korean War brought forth dehumanizing descriptions of a “yellow tide” along with familiar commentaries on the Asian disregard for human life. In 1962 The Manchurian Candidate pulled together more than a decade of anti-Chinese discourse into one of the definitive works of Cold War filmmaking. Set in the aftermath of the Korean War, it imagined a complex communist plot to get a spineless, McCarthy-like senator elected president and thereby put his wife—a communist agent—into a position of power in the White House. The film linked the threat of Asian communism with that posed by changing gender roles by making its central villain a domineering wife and mother with grandiose political ambitions. The film presents the communist Chinese and North Koreans as devious foreign enemies who have learned how to insinuate themselves into the American political system, the American family, even the American mind: its most memorable scene presents a demonstration of Chinese “brainwashing” techniques on American soldiers who prove so defenseless against this mysterious Oriental knowledge that they kill one another without compunction. Brainwashed, these Americans become like Asians, like communists: passive, conformist, and obedient to authority. The film also links Asian enemies abroad with an Asian American threat within the nation: the Asian houseboy who seems so submissive and eager to please turns out to be a North Korean agent skilled in the deadly arts of hand-to-hand combat. According to The Manchurian Candidate, contact with Asians, either at home or abroad, could only weaken the nation. While American participation in the Korean War halted the spread of communism in northeast Asia, it also opened up a hole in the nation’s defenses, allowing the Asian menace to invade and corrupt America. Asian-ness, it suggested, was something to be kept out of the United States at all costs.23

WHAT ARE WE FOR?

The Truman administration’s campaign against domestic and international communism worked, and between 1947 and 1950 Congress endorsed the major foreign policy initiatives that established the foundations of the postwar world order. For all its rhetorical power, however, the global imaginary of containment had certain limitations as a means
of defining America's identity as a global power in the era of decolonization. In fact, it gave rise to questions that proved difficult to answer. Many political elites saw anticommunism's negative formulation of American identity as an ideological weakness and regularly expressed a desire for a more positive one. Raymond Fosdick, Acheson's Far East consultant, gave this question its most common formulation in 1949: "It seems to me that too much thinking in the [State] Department is negative. . . . We are against communism, but what are we for?"24

The "What are we for?" question arose from anxiety over the perceived attractiveness of communism. Political elites sometimes stepped back from their public denunciations of the Soviet Union as a soul-killing bastion of enforced conformity and acknowledged communism's appeal. They recognized that to poor people struggling to improve their lives, communism's promise of economic equality and rapid development had a strong allure, while its idealistic vision of shared burdens and brotherhood held a deep spiritual attraction. Political elites feared that the U.S. could not compete with communism's vision of solidarity and a better world. In 1945 William Donovan, then director of the Office of Strategic Services and later ambassador to Thailand, expressed a commonly held view when he told Truman that the Soviets had "a strong drawing card in the proletarian philosophy of Communism," while the U.S. and its allies had "no political or social philosophy equally dynamic or alluring." The "What are we for?" question became even more urgent after 1954, when the vulgar anticommunism of McCarthyism had burned itself out. In a 1955 meeting with Eisenhower, T. S. Repplier, president of the Advertising Council, urged the president to find a way to compete with the universal appeal of communism:

Briefly, it cannot be denied that in theory Communism is idealistic and moralistic. It promises help for the helpless, relief for the downtrodden. In short, it appeals profoundly to those with a sense of social justice; and as a result it has incredible ability to stir up quasi-religious fervor.

I believe the United States will operate under a serious handicap until we can hold up for the world a countering inspirational concept. We cannot be merely against Communism; we suffer from the lack of a positive crusade. We need to focus on a moralistic idea with the power to stir men's imagination.25

When the members of the National Security Council sat down in 1950 to draft NSC 68, one of the basic blueprints of containment policy, they, too, grappled with the problem of how to translate the Cold War into an appealing structure of feeling based on something other than fear.

Robert Lovett, former undersecretary of state and later secretary of defense, insisted that "if we can sell every useless article known to man in large quantities, we should be able to sell our very fine story in larger quantities." But how to "sell" the "story" of containment's policies was precisely the problem, since emphasizing a military buildup and the conflict with the Soviets might backfire by raising fears of America becoming a "garrison state." One participant—the acting assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs—focused on the emotional needs of Americans. "What we have to do," he insisted, "is to convince not only their minds but their hearts. What we need to do is to make the 'cold war' a 'warm war' by infusing into it ideological principles to give it meaning." With this call to "warm" up the Cold War and to infuse it with "meaning" beyond anticommunism, the NSC articulated the need to reach Americans at the level of their "hearts." In the end, the members of the NSC did rely on anticommunism to sell Truman's agenda: NSC 68 is one of the core expressions of the global imaginary of containment. But the internal debate also marked a recognition that fear and the negative logic of anticommunism could not by themselves serve as the unifying concepts that the global expansion of American power demanded.26

The global imaginary of containment also offered little protection from the accusations of imperialism that dogged the U.S. throughout the 1950s. Imperialism became a hotly contested term between the U.S. and the Soviets, as each side accused the other of pursuing imperialistic aims in the decolonizing world. As the U.S. replaced Britain as the world's most powerful country, it was often seen as taking on its imperial role as well. Asian and African nationalists regularly accused the U.S. of reintroducing Western colonial power under a new guise, a charge they substantiated by pointing to U.S. support for European colonial regimes and the proliferation of overseas U.S. military bases. Even U.S. allies shared this perspective at times: one American military advisor in South Vietnam identified "the continual task of assuring the Vietnamese that the United States is not a colonial power" as perhaps "the greatest single problem encountered" by the Military Assistance and Advisory Group. Washington was intensely aware of the need to deny the charge of imperialism and worked hard to identify the U.S. with the forces of independence. It produced reams of propaganda identifying the U.S. as the first postcolonial nation and publicized its support for Indian and Indonesian independence and its own voluntary decolonization of the Philippines in 1946.27

Imperialism in the 1950s was seen as inseparable from racism, and
critics of the U.S. most often validated their accusations of imperialism by pointing out the unequal legal and social status—the internal colonization, as it were—of black Americans. The Soviet and Asian press paid close attention to race relations within the U.S.; State Department officials estimated that half of the Soviet's anti-American propaganda focused on racial issues. The world media gave prominent coverage to the lynching of Emmett Till in 1955, the expulsion of Atherine Lucy from the University of Alabama in 1956, the desegregation crisis in Little Rock in 1957, and other episodes of racial injustice. U.S. policymakers took these accusations seriously and worried that American racism was delegitimizing U.S. claims to world leadership in the eyes of Asians and Africans. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who described the poor state of domestic race relations as the “Achilles’ heel” of U.S. foreign relations, warned that discrimination caused significant “damage” to America’s world standing and “jeopardize[d]” the strength of its alliances. A source of “constant embarrassment” abroad, it created a “formidable obstacle” to the achievement of Washington’s goals. The members of the National Security Council also took accusations of imperialism into account when they formulated foreign policy. NSC 48, one of the key post-war policy directives on Asia, expressed concern that the achievement of U.S. goals in Asia was being hampered by “Asian resentments and suspicions of the West” and noted that the communists were succeeding in presenting themselves as the champions of “the national revolution against western imperialism.” Questions of racism thus served to link the domestic American sphere with the sphere of foreign relations, proving their inseparability: how Americans dealt with the problem of race relations at home had a direct impact on their success in dealing with the decolonizing world abroad.\(^{28}\)

Both the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations tried to minimize the deleterious effects of U.S. race relations on foreign policy. They feared that if Asian leaders came to see the U.S. as irredeemably racist, they would refuse to align themselves with Washington and would thus be “lost” to America. These foreign policy concerns prompted Truman to promote early civil rights legislation and support civil rights cases coming before the Supreme Court. Eisenhower, far less committed to the principle of racial equality, supported much weaker civil rights legislation and made known his unwillingness to intervene in what he saw as established social customs. Despite this uneven commitment to changing the institutional and legal structures that regulated race, both administrations regularly gave verbal support to the principles of racial tolerance and equality. They worked hard to manage the international perception, if not always the material conditions, of American race relations.\(^{29}\)

As a result, antiracism occupied an ambiguous position in the ideological landscape of the Cold War. On the one hand, as one of the core principles of the Communist Party and the Popular Front, it was associated with an illegitimate form of internationalism and seen as an invitation to investigate. As the chairman of one loyalty board put it, “Of course the fact that a person believes in racial equality doesn’t prove that he’s a Communist, but it certainly does make you look twice, doesn’t it? On the other hand, professions of racial tolerance and inclusiveness became a staple of Cold War political rhetoric and appeared regularly in political speeches, policy documents, and newspaper editorials across the political spectrum. Antiracism thus became both a Cold War liability and a Cold War imperative, a mark of lingering leftist commitments and an integral component of the anticommunist program of winning the support of the decolonizing world.\(^{30}\)

### THE GLOBAL IMAGINARY OF INTEGRATION

Political elites tried to resolve some of the problems raised by the global imaginary of containment by shifting emphasis and defining the U.S. through its alliances rather than its enmities. By emphasizing the economic, political, and military integration of the noncommunist world, policymakers created another global imaginary that existed alongside that of containment as an alternative vision of how the world—or at least the “free world”—was organized.

Where the global imaginary of containment drew on the residual internationalism of the right, with its vision of bulwarks between nations and a mortal conflict between communism and capitalism, the global imaginary of integration drew on the residual internationalism of the left, which imagined the world in terms of open doors that superseded barriers and created pathways between nations. It constructed a world in which differences could be bridged and transcended. In the political rhetoric of integration, relationships of “cooperation” replaced those of conflict, “mutuality” replaced enmity, and “collective security,” “common bonds,” and “community” became the preferred terms for representing the relationship between the United States and the noncommunist world.\(^{31}\)

Arthur Schlesinger Jr. articulated some of the key concepts of the global imaginary of integration. The young Harvard historian was an
emblematic figure of the Cold War historical bloc. Untainted by any association with 1930s radicalism, he helped found the Americans for Democratic Action, a political group that enlisted the support of prominent New Deal figures such as Eleanor Roosevelt, defined itself in opposition to Henry Wallace's communist-supported Progressive Citizens of America, and pushed the Democratic party solidly into line behind Truman's foreign policies. With The Vital Center, published in 1949, Schlesinger produced a popular manifesto that explained and generated enthusiasm for Truman's model of internationalism. Excerpted in general-circulation magazines and widely reviewed, it was hailed by the Saturday Review for announcing "the spirit of a time to itself." 32

Although Schlesinger devoted considerable attention in The Vital Center to laying out the rationales for containment, he also proposed to answer the "What are we for?" question by crafting a positive agenda for waging the Cold War. In doing so, he translated the ideology and foreign policies of international integration into a sentimental structure of feeling. At first this seems unlikely: Schlesinger explicitly condemned the "sentimentality" of the political left, embraced a Niehburian realism which posited the inherent imperfection of man, and promoted a revivified masculinity of toughness that condemned the left for being "soft, not hard." Yet one cannot fully understand the broad impact that The Vital Center had without recognizing the ways that it tapped into this powerful strain of American cultural and political thought. Published in the same year that China was "lost" to America as both an ally and an object of sympathy, Schlesinger's book redirected Americans' sentimental impulses out to the decolonizing world in general. 33

In keeping with the sentimental tradition, Schlesinger identified America's global problem as an excess of individualism and an insufficiency of bonding, and advocated its solution in terms of fostering a greater sense of the self-in-relation. Echoing Erich Fromm's Escape from Freedom, Schlesinger argued that industrial modernization had destroyed traditional social orders based on organic communities and personal ties, and replaced them with fragmented social orders, characterized by "frustration," "isolation," and "anxiety," in which individual responsibility had become overwhelming and freedom a "burden." Totalitarianism arose because it promised to alleviate this burden of freedom and to restore the bonds of community: to a people suffering from anomie, it offered "the security and comradeship of a crusading unit." If Americans hoped to prevent people around the world from choosing communism, Schlesinger insisted, they needed to match the appeal of totalitarianism by making "a positive and continuing commitment" to restoring a sense of "community." Americans must move away from their traditional conception of democracy, which tended toward a "sterile" and "arrogant" emphasis on individualism, and instead redefine it in terms of "solidarity with other human beings." 34

Schlesinger grappled with the damning accusations of racism and imperialism by appropriating the ideal of antiracism from the political left and defining this community as a multiracial one. Acknowledging that the American Communist Party had made the "Negro problem" one of its highest priorities (although he insisted the effort was insincere), he called upon Americans to eradicate their collective "sin of racial prejudice." Like Secretary of State Dean Acheson, he linked the domestic and the foreign policy spheres: he argued that the U.S. was losing the Cold War in Asia and Africa in part because the Soviet Union, untainted by colonialism, could claim the banner of racial equality and contrast itself to the Western democracies, whose domestic societies and colonies had been characterized by "racial cruelties." Schlesinger attacked the persistence of American racism—"We have freed the slaves; but we have not freed Negroes, Jews and Asians of the stigmatas of slavery"—and insisted that it undermined national security. The competition over the decolonizing world, Schlesinger argued, demanded that Americans "demonstrate a deep and effective concern with the racial inequalities within the United States" and "reform our own racial practices" by dismantling Jim Crow and repealing "such insulting symbols as the Oriental exclusion laws." This commitment to racial equality and civil rights had to go beyond laws, however, and become personally and deeply felt: all Americans had an obligation "to extirpate the prejudices of bigotry" not only "in our environment" but "above all, in ourselves." In Schlesinger's view, Americans would not be able to create a viable "free" community with the Asian and African peoples abroad until they created a multiracial community that included them at home. Like Popular Fronters, Schlesinger advocated a revised national identity that defined Americanness in multiracial and multi-ethnic terms. He suggested that integration, like containment, had to become a domestic as well as a foreign policy: waging the Cold War demanded not only the containment of American communists, sympathizers, and fellow travelers, but also the social integration of Asian and African and Jewish Americans. 35

Schlesinger's sentimentalism allows us to see the extent to which the entire conceptualization of the Cold War as a problem of winning the allegiance of others was itself a sentimental formulation, grounded in the
fear of loss and the desire for connection. Schlesinger and other creators of the global imaginary of integration managed the anxiety of the potential loss of Asia and the rest of the Third World by affirming America's need—and ability—to establish bonds of connection. As part of their effort to recover from the trauma of "losing" China, they focused on forging new and more secure ties to the decolonizing nations.

Eisenhower played a major role in constructing these bonds, both real and imagined, to the decolonizing world. The Truman administration had focused its attention on Europe, and by 1950 the political situation there had largely stabilized. After the Chinese and Korean crises of 1949–50, however, Asia increasingly moved to the forefront of foreign policy concerns. Eisenhower won the 1952 election not only by promising to end the Korean War, but also by supporting China Lobby accusations that the Democrats had underestimated the communist threat to Asia in general. By mid-decade, Asia had become a focal point of the Cold War: the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 and the subsequent creation of Ho Chi Minh's communist government in North Vietnam made all of Southeast Asia appear vulnerable; the Bandung conference of Asian and African nations in 1955 testified to the growing economic and political nationalism in the decolonizing world; and Khrushchev was funneling Soviet support to independence movements throughout the periphery via his "peaceful coexistence" campaign. Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, concerned that the decolonizing world was indeed turning toward the Soviet Union, stepped up their efforts at economic and political integration: they condemned expressions of Third World neutrality, expanded the alliance system to include virtually every non-neutral nation, increased foreign aid programs for nations willing to ally themselves with U.S. interests, initiated nation-building efforts in South Vietnam and elsewhere, and attempted to topple governments—successfully in Iran and Guatemala, unsuccessfully in Indonesia—that they saw as trying to limit their nation's engagement in the capitalist "free world" system.36

A State Department map of the world "United States Collective Defense Arrangements" visually expresses the global imaginary of "free world" integration (Figure 5). Published in 1955, a year after Dien Bien Phu, it offers a sharp counterpoint to Life's 1947 map of "world struggle." The map centers on the United States and gives equal visual status to the northern and southern hemispheres. This map marginalizes the Soviet Union, pushing it to the edges of the frame and splitting it in two, thereby diminishing the importance of the U.S.-Soviet opposition.
It assigns primary significance to the network of treaties that unites the U.S. with over forty countries in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Eschewing a bipolar model, this map presents a world structured by a web of ties radiating out from Washington. The lines that link countries together, in contrast to the gestural arrows on the 1947 map, do not suggest aggression, conflict, or competition of any sort. Rather, their straightness and rootedness in the circles that identify the treaties suggest a stable international order built on the principle of U.S.-centered collectivity.37

Eisenhower worked hard to direct Americans' attention to the decolonizing world. He recognized that most Americans did not feel the same bond to the people of the periphery that they felt to Europeans, with whom they shared myriad ties of history and culture. Many Americans in fact believed that differences in race and culture made it unwise for the U.S. to involve itself too deeply in Asian affairs. In an effort to counter this view, U.S. policymakers tried to educate Americans about the bonds that already tied them to the decolonizing world and urged them to recognize that differences of language, religion, history, and race could be bridged. Francis Wilcox's call for a sentimental "education for overseasmanship" was part of this larger project of mapping the world in terms of emotional and intellectual affiliations, of teaching Americans to understand themselves not just as citizens of an autonomous nation but as participants in a world system that inextricably embedded them within a network of multinational ties. With speeches such as Wilcox's, the Eisenhower administration invited Americans to see—even as it discursively constructed—their connections with the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.38

Eisenhower tried to elevate free trade and economic integration to the level of national ideology, much as Truman had done with anticommuism and containment. He consistently emphasized the economic nature of the bonds that tied the U.S. to nations around the world. Throughout his two administrations, the president vigorously promoted a foreign economic policy based on reducing obstacles to trade, increasing overseas capital investment, and stimulating foreign economic growth with infusions of aid. Deeply concerned about maintaining access to the resources of the decolonizing world, he regularly publicized America's need for "continuously expanding world markets," and he defined the nation's fundamental interest as the ability "to trade freely, in spite of anything Russia may do, with those areas from which we obtain the raw materials that are vital to our economy."39

The president began this effort in his first inaugural address in 1953. Although he opened with the familiar language of containment—the "forces of good and evil are massed and armed and opposed as never before. . . . Freedom is pitted against slavery; light against dark"—he quickly moved beyond this conflictual imagery. Americans did not stand alone in their opposition to communism, he suggested, but were joined by the people of other nations: a "common dignity," he explained, united the "French soldier who dies in Indochina, the British soldier killed in Malaya, the American life given in Korea." Lest such phrasing imply merely an alliance among Western colonial powers, Eisenhower explicitly distanced the U.S. both from "imperialism" and from "any insinuation that one race or another. . . . is in any sense inferior or expendable." His vision of international "unity" included the people of Asia and Latin America as well as those of Europe. Turning from military images to pastoral ones, he invoked a "common bond" that "binds the grower of rice in Burma and the planter of wheat in Iowa, the shepherd in southern Italy and the mountaineer in the Andes." Although Eisenhower understood this bond in ideological terms, as a shared "faith" in "freedom," he emphasized its economic nature as well. The pursuit of "economic solitude" by other nations would endanger the U.S. just as much as would the expansion of communism: "We need markets in the world for the surpluses of our farms and our factories," he explained to his listeners, as well as access to the "vital materials and products of distant lands." If Americans wanted to understand their new role in the postwar era, Eisenhower insisted, they needed to conceptualize the world not only in terms of conflict, but also in terms of this "basic law of interdependence." Eisenhower saw this interdependence—this inescapable interconnectedness—as the essence of the postwar world order, and he spent the next eight years trying to persuade the country to see it also.40

Eschewing containment's language of barriers, Eisenhower regularly used the language of transnational "flows" to illustrate this interdependence. Through free trade and private capital investment, Eisenhower assured Americans, the "flow" of U.S. dollars abroad would be matched by a corresponding "flow" of raw materials into the nation, and together they would unite the nations of the "free world" into a mutually beneficent union. Eisenhower and Dulles presented their goal as the eradication of "barriers to mutual trade," which would lead to the creation of "an international society in which men, goods, and ideas flow freely and without obstruction through a wide area." These intertwined concepts of flow and exchange emerged as central ideas during the Cold War.
They defined the “free world” as a place where people, commodities, resources, and the products of intellectual activity could move easily across national boundaries, and distinguished it from the Soviet “bloc,” where all of these things were trapped behind iron and bamboo curtains. The language of flow also suggested that the bonds of interdependence were flexible, originating in multiple centers and moving in multiple directions. Although the United States benefited from these flows, their fluid nature implied that the U.S. neither controlled them nor used them to dominate others.  

Eisenhower also softened his economic language by translating the principle of interdependence into the more emotionally resonant language of community. He and Dulles inverted Schlesinger’s critique of democracy’s sterile individualism by characterizing the U.S. as the defender of community and then casting neutralist-minded Third World nations as advocates of a dangerously excessive individualism. In one 1957 speech, for example, Dulles condemned “self-centered” decolonizing nations who “put what they deem their own national rights and interests above the need of the whole society of nations,” and contrasted them with more collective-minded nations, such as the United States, which “subordinate national interests to the interest of the world community.” “Nations, like individuals,” he insisted, “cannot live to themselves alone,” and he warned against new nations that embrace “strident and embittered nationalism.” The United States, he made clear, was “unsympathetic to assertions of sovereignty which do not accept the concept of social interdependence.” Dulles’s characterization of international “interdependence” as “social,” however, barely masked the coercive nature of his threat to withdraw, or refuse to extend, the nation’s sympathy. Economic and political nationalism in the periphery posed a risk to the international economic system that Dulles and Eisenhower found unacceptable, and they attacked it as a threat to the bonds of community.

Developing nations were not the only ones who resisted the “basic law of interdependence,” however; they were joined by economic nationalists within the U.S. who feared the domestic effects of increased trade. This tension came to a head on the issue of foreign aid. Eisenhower was a fierce proponent of foreign aid, which he deemed the best mechanism for integrating the decolonizing world: he saw it as a means to stimulate struggling economies, open new markets, and increase the overall flow of goods and resources. Neither Congress nor the public shared this enthusiasm, however, and foreign aid programs, especially those aimed at Asia, quickly developed into the most contentious foreign policy issue of his presidency. Newspapers and magazines attacked foreign aid as wasteful and inefficient, while Congress fought and cut every aid allocation that the president requested. Eisenhower saw this resistance as evidence of the public’s “abyssal ignorance” about the realities of economic interdependence, and he vowed to counter that ignorance with new forms of education.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE: CREATING A FEELING OF “WE”

The People-to-People program was one of the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to cultivate public support for the foreign aid program and for Cold War internationalism in general. It was an attempt to make the idea of international interdependence come alive in the popular mind. The program’s creators also saw it as a means to address some of the questions that had plagued policymakers since the outset of the Cold War: How can we “warm up” the Cold War in ways that will appeal to American “hearts”? How can we transform it into a positive crusade? How can we encourage Americans to abandon their lingering isolationism and learn to see themselves in relation to other peoples around the world? The People-to-People program served as a culminating point at which many of the ideological concerns of the early Cold War converged. Ultimately, the program was an effort to give the global imaginary of integration a material, institutional foundation.

The United States Information Agency (USIA) formulated the People-to-People program in 1955, and Eisenhower launched it in 1956. The program consisted of forty-two committees that arranged contacts between Americans and people around the world who shared a common interest. A quasi-public, quasi-private program, it was created, but not fully funded or administered, by the federal government; the committees served independently of one another under the leadership of private citizens who had been selected by the USIA Office of Private Cooperation. The People-to-People program functioned as an umbrella organization that promoted, coordinated, and raised the public profile of private efforts, some of which were already well established. As such, it both created something new and supplied a name for activities that had been taking place since the beginning of the Cold War.

The program emerged out of Washington’s postwar thinking about culture. American policymakers had long admired the Soviets for their skill at using culture for political ends and for their ability to mobilize
people through social organizations, and in the late 1940s they began to emulate Soviet tactics. The result was the cultural Cold War, which the U.S. waged with varying degrees of openness. Covertly, the CIA provided funds for cultural organizations, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom, that tried to wean Western European artists and intellectuals away from Marxism. Overtly, Washington created a range of cultural diplomacy programs that fostered intellectual linkages across national borders and encouraged positive feelings toward the U.S. These programs introduced the world to abstract expressionist painting, sent African American jazz musicians on tour, and made American books available through USIA libraries. The People-to-People program emerged out of this cultural diplomacy framework: it was aimed at an international audience and designed to spread American culture, values, and ideas overseas. It sought to counter Soviet propaganda by promoting face-to-face contact between Americans and people in other countries and thereby display what America was “really” like.45

People-to-People had a double nature, however: it was also a domestic education program. Eisenhower administration officials had learned the lesson that missionaries and Popular Fronters knew so well: that internationalist visions enjoyed popular support to the extent that they could be embedded in social institutions and cultural practices. The People-to-People program was designed to give Cold War internationalism a social and cultural foundation. It sought to enlist the public in Washington's world-ordering project of “free world” integration by turning it into a project in which ordinary Americans could feel a personal stake. At any given moment in 1955, approximately two million Americans were living, working, or traveling abroad. While policymakers recognized this as global expansion in action and generally saw it in positive terms, it also caused them anxiety. Eisenhower feared that since most Americans did not fully comprehend the principles of U.S. foreign policy, those who interacted with people abroad might inadvertently impede the achievement of U.S. goals by saying or doing inappropriate things. The Eisenhower administration devised the People-to-People program as a means of what it called “orchestrating” this overseas flow of Americans and coordinating it with the overall aims of U.S. foreign policy. When Eisenhower invited prominent citizens to join People-to-People, he emphasized the need to enlist ordinary Americans in the job of waging the Cold War: “Our American ideology,” he explained, will only “win out in the great struggle” if it has “the active support” of “millions of individual Americans acting through person-to-person commu-

ication in foreign lands.” Secretary of State Dulles agreed: according to John Juergensmeyer, who studied the program in the late 1950s, Dulles welcomed People-to-People as “a valuable device to create a sense of public participation in the government’s Cold War policies.”46

The People-to-People program invested the quotidian culture and daily practices of the American middle class with internationalist meaning. It established committees organized around the professions (banking), hobbies (stamp collecting), reading (books and magazines), and leisure (sports). The music committee facilitated Van Cliburn’s entry into the Moscow music festival, the hobbies committee sent gardening equipment around the world, and the civic committee arranged sister-city affiliations. Although People-to-People coordinated fewer projects in Asia than in some other parts of the “free world,” it arranged numerous sister-city affiliations with Japan, sent books to the Philippines and magazines to India, Taiwan, and Cambodia, facilitated letter-writing campaigns by American schoolchildren, and sponsored English instruction by U.S. military personnel stationed throughout the region. Some of the most successful efforts focused on travel, orphaned children, and medicine. The national cartoonist’s committee produced a hundred-page booklet instructing American tourists in how to behave abroad so as to avoid generating ill-will toward the U.S. Members of the U.S. military stationed in Asia frequently supported orphans, donating time and money to help local children. Project HOPE was the most successful Asian endeavor: the medical committee refitted an eight-hundred-bed Navy medical ship, staffed it with medical personnel, and sent it to Southeast Asia as a floating clinic, hospital, and teaching center. The project generated great publicity in the U.S. and in Asia, and galvanized generous support from American corporations and individuals. Abbot Washburn, the deputy director of the USIA and originator of the People-to-People program, singled out Project HOPE as a domestic education success: it “brought into active participation in foreign affairs thousands of important people in American life” and generated “public support for the overall Mutual Security Program,” which was the administration’s main vehicle for foreign aid.47

As this linkage of People-to-People with foreign aid suggests, the Eisenhower administration understood the program as an adjunct to its foreign economic policy. When the president first introduced the People-to-People program in a 1956 commencement address at Baylor University, he framed it in terms of the economic integration of the noncommunist world. Eisenhower used the speech to reiterate his views on the
"economic interdependence of peoples" and the threat to world prosperity posed by the "intense nationalism" of some "new nations," who felt such an "emotional urge for a completely independent existence" that they constructed "barriers" and "obstacles" to the "flow of trade." Such restrictions, he explained, inevitably depressed living standards and created a breeding ground for communism. These barriers could only be broken down through increased international "cooperation," and Eisenhower invited his audience of college seniors to facilitate this cooperation by joining one of the voluntary associations that "promote people-to-people contact around the world." Eisenhower thus rhetorically opened up Cold War foreign policy to individual participation: he suggested that ordinary Americans could foster the integration of the decolonizing world into the capitalist world system by undertaking voluntary activities and forging personal relationships. This coordination of the People-to-People program with the goal of international economic integration occurred at the institutional level as well. The chairs and board members of People-to-People committees often represented the economic interests that had the most to gain from integration. The board of directors of Project HOPE, for instance, consisted largely of executives from pharmaceutical companies (Smith, Kline & French), international hotel chains (Hilton), the entertainment industry (the Motion Picture Association of America), international tourism companies (American President Lines, Pan American Airways), and defense contractors (General Dynamics).  

The People-to-People program helped construct the global imaginary of integration by insisting that vast differences among peoples could be bridged with relative ease. Eisenhower believed that the program would enable people around the world to "leap governments" and "work out not one method but thousands of methods" for learning about and forging ties with each other. In marked contrast to the global imaginary of containment, with its focus on bulwarks and conflict, the People-to-People program imagined a "free world" in which there existed no barriers—geographical, political, linguistic, religious—that ordinary citizens could not "leap." The program encouraged Americans to "reach across the seas and national boundaries to their counterparts in other lands," and it held out the promise that by doing so they could create that sense of multiracial, multinational community that Schlesinger had invoked.  

Eisenhower made the sentimental logic of the People-to-People program explicit in his speeches publicizing the program. In them he translated the "cold" principles of international capitalist economics into a "warm" and sentimental structure of feeling that could be inhabited at the level of everyday life. In Eisenhower's hands, the international arena became a domain of the personal, and economic integration became a question of understanding the feelings of other peoples around the world, rather than an expression of U.S. imperialism. Cooperation, he insisted, depended upon the realization that "every international problem is in reality a human one." Only through personal contacts could people come to understand that they were already "linked in partnership with hundreds of millions of like-minded people around the globe." Sympathy, the highest of sentimental values, had to form the sinews of this partnership. "People are what count," he insisted, and a "sympathetic understanding of the aspirations, the hopes and fears, the traditions and prides of other peoples and nations" was "essential to the promotion of mutual prosperity and peace." Eisenhower made sympathy—the ability to feel what another person feels, to share in his or her conditions and experiences—the defining feature of American globalism, and he commended those Americans who engaged in international communication that entailed "talking from the heart to the heart." Such "sympathetic understanding" was "a compulsory requirement on each of us if, as a people, we are to discharge our inescapable national responsibility to lead the world in the growth of freedom and of human dignity." One has the sense that Eisenhower believed that if he could stimulate the flow of feelings across national borders, he would also smooth the international flows of capital, manufactured goods, and raw materials.  

The People-to-People program offered a sentimental answer to the "What are we for?" question. In a 1959 book entitled What We Are For, Arthur Larson, a People-to-People official and former USIA director and speech writer for Eisenhower, grappled directly with the problem of defining America in an international context as something other than the opposite of communism. In the post-McCarthy era, he wrote, when "the dead weight of a decade of negativism is not easily thrown off," Americans needed to "discover and articulate clearly and affirmatively what we stand for and where we are going." Larson, like Eisenhower, made sympathy the defining characteristic of Cold War America. He determined that the key to America's relations with other peoples "lies in one word: 'identification,'" by which he meant "understanding the common principles that we believe in and that bind us together." The goal of such identification would be to create a "feeling, in relation to people
of other countries, of 'we.' Not 'we' and 'they.'" If Americans "could once and for all become suffused with this concept of identification," then they could "create a people-to-people understanding between our own people and the people of countries now estranged from us." The People-to-People program encouraged Americans to enlarge their understanding of who constituted the "we" with whom they identified, and to redefine that "we" in international rather than merely local or national terms.51

The People-to-People program produced a national identity for the United States that differed radically from that produced by the global imaginary of containment. In this vision, America was less a free-standing, armed defender of the world and more a member of a community bound together through emotional bonds. One can read this assertion of an international "we" as a means of assuaging the anxiety that some Americans felt about U.S. expansion and the resistance it provoked, a way to stave off the dreaded loss of the Third World and to counterbalance containment's emphasis on fear of difference. It served as a way for Americans to affirm themselves as a global yet non-imperial power.

The People-to-People program, like the dual containment and integration foreign policy itself, carried within it the residual ideologies and cultural logics of both left-liberal and right internationalism. Although Eisenhower denied any desire to convert other countries to American ways, the People-to-People program was clearly indebted to the missionary tradition of internationalism. As a voluntary program run by private citizens, it looked back to the pre–World War II era when private and missionary organizations delivered most foreign aid. As had missionaries, the program implied that Americans and their allies abroad shared essentially identical interests, if not cultures, and it advocated personal contact and communication as the best way to spread American political values overseas. In its emphasis on ordinary Americans reaching out to help the less fortunate—by sending them American books, by teaching them to speak English—it continued the missionary legacy of individuals performing good works for the underprivileged.52

Perhaps more surprising, the People-to-People program also perpetuated elements of left-liberal internationalism. The program seems to have been part of Washington's effort to emulate Soviet cultural strategies. At the level of institutional organization, People-to-People echoed the Popular Front's structure of a loosely affiliated network of groups that promoted participation in international affairs. One can read the People-to-People committees, which were formed soon after the last up-dating of the attorney general's list of "subversive" organizations, as replacements for the Popular Front organizations that had been driven out of existence. Perhaps most important, the People-to-People program, like the Popular Front, appealed to Americans by saturating cultural forms and activities with political and specifically internationalist meaning. People-to-People officials privately acknowledged this debt to the Popular Front, and one internal memo appraising the organization's activities in 1959 traced the program's conceptual roots to the Kremlin:

For a parallel or antecedent operation of this type, one must look more to the Soviet Union and Communist bloc, whose social and cultural organizations have been politically oriented and internationally active for a generation. The Communist world front movement of women's, youth, labor, writer's [sic], veterans and other social and professional organizations (once claiming more than 100 million members) germinated under the Comintern during the 1920's and blossomed during the 1930's and 1940's. At the end of the 1940's, however, it had become Stalin's political instrument.

People-to-People planners seemed to have imagined their program as taking over and redirecting the internationalist energies of the delegitimized Popular Front. The People-to-People program assured Americans that by sending their favorite books and records overseas and by sharing hobbies such as gardening, stamp collecting, and coin collecting, they could continue to stand, as they had in the 1930's, with people around the world who were resisting totalitarian domination. At the same time these positive activities also replaced the negative social practices, such as naming names, that domestic containment policies had encouraged and that faded away with the collapse of McCarthy.53

The dual nature of the People-to-People program meant that contemporaries saw it as simultaneously a failure and a success. When they evaluated it as a cultural diplomacy effort aimed at overseas audiences, observers often viewed it with contempt. The People-to-People Foundation, which sought to raise funds for individual committees, failed to generate any philanthropic enthusiasm and shut down after a year. Foreign affairs professionals, including members of the U.S. foreign service, by and large refused to support the program and rejected it as an "amateurish" approach to a complicated world which failed to consider the needs and problems of peoples overseas. One cultural affairs officer in Asia condemned the program for its superficiality and its American focus. Dismissing it as mere "lip service" and "slogans," he characterized the program as a bunch of Americans "running around with flags in both hands forgetting that other people have a story too."
official in Asia dismissed the program as an "appeal to walk around with a smiling facade and a mouth full of teeth showing," which the locals knew as "phony." Still others damned it as "superficial," "marginal," "unimportant," "meddlesome," and "too propagandistic." 54

As a domestic education program designed to turn Americans' attention to international issues, however, contemporaries hailed it a success. In fact, foreign affairs professionals disliked the program precisely because it was so clearly designed for American participation rather than for overseas effectiveness. Ordinary Americans embraced the program with enthusiasm, and virtually every nationally organized group in the country included People-to-People efforts in its activities. Even the USIA officials in Asia who dismissed the program's impact there acknowledged that it had produced among ordinary Americans a greater awareness of Asia as a primary site of the Cold War. According to John Juergensmeyer, these officials identified "the increased American consciousness of foreign problems, particularly in Asia" as "one of the most valuable benefits" of the program. He also reported that U.S. officials overseas particularly praised the program for "increasing the political consciousness of American tourists." At a time when heated debates over foreign aid threatened to erode support for Eisenhower's foreign economic policy, the People-to-People program encouraged Americans to feel personally involved in the task of international integration. 55

The immediate postwar period saw an extended effort to define the type of internationalism that Americans should embrace. As policymakers formulated a distinctly Cold War internationalism based on the twin pillars of containment and integration, they worked to disaffiliate the United States from those models of internationalism, such as colonialism, that were practiced by the declining European powers, and from the communist internationalism practiced by its adversary, the Soviet Union. At the same time, they worked to delegitimize alternative models of international engagement that had substantial domestic followings, such as the unilateralist right internationalism of the Republican party and the left internationalism of Henry Wallace and the Popular Front. Even as the Truman and Eisenhower administrations delegitimized these competing models, however, they appropriated some of their core concepts and their strategies of social motivation. This struggle to reshape and limit the ways Americans understood their relationship to the world was an integral part of winning popular support for Cold War foreign policies, and it took place in the sphere of culture as well as in the sphere of politics.

Near the end of his first year as secretary of state, John Foster Dulles delivered a speech, hosted by the New York Herald Tribune, on the need to secure public support for the waging of the Cold War. He explained that, with isolation no longer a viable option, the United States in recent years had to find a new way to be "part of the world." He contrasted the American "pattern for international living" with that of the Soviets: where the Soviet Union ruled its citizens and allies through "coercion," the United States, he explained, was a "society of consent" which achieved national and international unity through "the free acceptance of concepts which override differences." Ideas rather than brute force were what ultimately mattered, he suggested. Dulles explained that the working of this "system of consent" was "a slow business" requiring "persistence" and an "unwillingness to be discouraged." It depended upon a sustained effort to articulate and disseminate the "unifying principles" and "formulations" which, "like magnets, will draw together those who are apart." As secretary of state, Dulles argued, securing this consent and creating this unity among Americans and their allies was part of his job. He also suggested that the media had an important role to play, and he appealed to his audience of newspaper men and women to facilitate the workings of consent by "clarifying the issues" so that unity could be achieved. 56

By and large, Dulles and other postwar political elites did secure public consent for the waging of the Cold War in Asia, at least through the mid-1960s. With varying degrees of enthusiasm Congress, and by extension the constituencies it represented, supported the range of foreign economic, political, and military policies—from alliances to free trade to outright war—that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations formulated for the decolonizing world. At the same time, however, that consent was never so solid that policymakers could take it for granted. The Korean War, while tolerated, never generated much popular enthusiasm; the actions against the governments of Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia had to be undertaken covertly rather than in open public view; and political elites felt the need to hide the full extent of U.S. political and military involvement in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

It is impossible, of course, to say definitively which of the innumerable factors in play at the time succeeded in securing public support for the policies of containment and integration. Was it the domestic containment policies that stifled dissent on foreign policy issues? A genuine
fear of communism? A sense of personal participation in the nation's world-ordering ambitions? A state of political apathy that encouraged passivity in the face of foreign affairs? Most likely consent, or the limitation of dissent, was secured through some combination of these and myriad other factors. My goal is not to single out the global imaginary of integration as the decisive factor, but somewhat more modestly to make it visible as one of the key "unifying principles" that political elites put forth in their effort to "draw together" the American people in support of the Cold War.

I believe that the global imaginary of integration played a particularly important role in the "slow business" of securing consent for the Cold War because it animated that global project with a positive energy. It could serve as an effective "unifying principle" because, unlike the global imaginary of containment, it was grounded in the very idea of unification. Fredric Jameson has described the working of hegemony as a "strategy of rhetorical persuasion in which substantive incentives are offered for ideological adherence." In order to perform their ideological functions, hegemonic texts and practices must articulate a genuine utopian vision: "They cannot manipulate unless they offer some genuine shred of content as a fantasy bribe to the public about to be so manipulated." Invariably, for Jameson, this utopian quality lies in the "symbolic enactment of collective unity." The global imaginary of integration offered precisely this idealistic and compelling vision of U.S.-Asian collectivity. Endlessly reiterated in political discourse, the idea of integration took on a host of political, economic, and personal meanings that revolved around the process of forging bonds with others across a divide of difference. As a utopian ideal, it served as a discursive mechanism for constructing the Cold War as a concrete, positive project that ordinary Americans could own through their participation.57

This imaginative mapping of America's relation to the capitalist "free world"—and to Asia and the decolonizing world in particular—was shaped by a broad array of cultural figures, as well as by political elites. These middletow intellectuals, who form the subject of the following chapters, served as the cultural wing of the Cold War historical bloc. They acted, with varying degrees of intentionality, as the storytellers of Cold War internationalism. Like the producers of missionary and Popular Front culture before them, they brought to life the abstract principles of a particular form of internationalism by translating them into a concrete body of social practices, aesthetic philosophies, and cultural forms. In the process, they further worked out the synthesis of left and right internationalisms that the Truman and Eisenhower administrations had achieved at the level of political ideology and policy. Collectively, these middlebrow artists and intellectuals produced a sentimental culture of integration that coexisted with and counterbalanced the culture of containment.

Some of the most popular stories that these middlebrow intellectuals told imagined interdependence in terms of medicine, travel, and adoption, and offered the jungle doctor, the tourist, and the white mother of Asian children as emblematic figures who embodied the ideal of an internationalist America. It is thus not surprising that contemporaries counted the People-to-People efforts organized along these lines as among the program's most successful. The People-to-People program achieved its goals, to the extent that it did, because it drew on what were becoming established ways of thinking about America's relationship with the decolonizing world. The program was thus not a unique phenomenon, but part of a larger set of social practices and cultural narratives that were taking shape over the course of the late 1940s and 1950s.

The outward-looking sensibility of the People-to-People program infused the Cold War with an expansive, optimistic, open quality that contrasted sharply with the thematic of restriction and suppression that cultural historians of containment have explored. This popular internationalism carried a particular set of meanings in the 1950s. However, these meanings did not remain stable, and as domestic and international political conditions changed during the 1960s and 1970s, so did the meanings that these so-called citizen diplomacy programs carried. In the mid-1980s the Sister Cities program, which had originated as a People-to-People project, emerged as a central institutional framework for the grassroots political movement opposing Ronald Reagan's renewal of the Cold War in Central America. Political activists were looking for ways to express their anger at the U.S. funding of the Contras, the right-wing paramilitary movement dedicated to overthrowing Nicaragua's elected socialist government. At the same time, they wanted to avoid the politically marginalizing and negative logic of traditional peace movements, which simply declared their opposition to an existing set of policies. As a solution they adopted the positive discourse of the People-to-People program and began creating Sister City ties with Nicaragua. These initiatives appealed to people across the social spectrum who liked the idea of taking a positive action and who wanted to forge an alternative network of ties with people whom Washington was demonizing as threats to national security. The U.S.-Nicaragua Sister Cities movement spread
quickly across the country as the Reagan administration stepped up its interventions in Central America: the ten programs that existed in 1985 doubled to twenty by 1986 and more than tripled to seventy-seven by 1987. Together they formed part of a network of organizations that offered an alternative source of news and education about events in Central America and sent money, food, medical supplies, and other forms of aid to people suffering the effects of U.S. foreign policy. Similar Sister City ties were established in the 1980s with other politically contested countries, including El Salvador, where the U.S. was backing right-wing elements in an ongoing civil war, and South Africa, where the U.S. supported the white minority apartheid government.  

Twenty years later, nongovernmental organizations that wanted to mobilize people against the corporate-led processes of globalization similarly appropriated People-to-People language. Global Exchange, for example, an organization that promoted itself as working for environmental, political, and social justice around the world, advertised its activities in left-liberal publications such as the Nation with the tag-line, “Building People-to-People Ties.” I think that we can read these late-and post-Cold War projects as a return of the political repressed. They represent a resurgence of some of the residual left-liberal internationalisms that the People-to-People program had co-opted in the 1950s, but that it had also sustained in a submerged form. As a hegemonic project, the People-to-People program had embraced some of the Popular Front political ideals—international solidarity, popular participation in foreign affairs—and linked them up with a larger Cold War program of anticommunism and global capitalist integration. As the Cold War waned, however, that linkage was loosened, and the merged People-to-People/Popular Front language became available for new political projects that contested, rather than supported, the global expansion of U.S. power and that imagined other forms of international integration.